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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. HATCH and 
HOBERT )L :McRAE, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
COeNTY, a party corporate 
Hll<l politic, State of Utah, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
STArrEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Case No. 
11594 
rl'his is an action to recover attorneys' fees and costs 
lllldPr tlw provisions of Title 77, Chapter 64, rcA, 1953, 
as amended, for se1Tices claimed rendered by the re-
spon<lPnts under appointmt>nt to represent an indigent 
<lt>l'<•n<lant in a criminal proceeding before the above-en-
ti tied court. 
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The case was tried lH'fol'P th(• ('<litrt. !'ron1 a judg. 
ment for the plaintiffs, the r<'spo;,d<·nb lH·1·p:11, th<' d1·. 
fondant, the appellant herPin, appeal::-;. 
Respondents st>ek a <l(•eision from this (•ourt affi l'lll-
ing the judgment of the lower court. 
STATEMEN'L1 OF' FAC'L1S 
Respondents agree in general with thr of 
Facts of tlw appellant, Pxcept that portion which 
"No other procednr<'s or ste1)s were taken h>- the l'PSIHlll-
dents to follow 'propl·r procPdnres', ... than the filillg 
of this complaint ... " 
On November 18, rnG7, respondents mailed a letter 
to the Board of County Ccm1111issio1wrs, dd't,ndant's Ex-
hibit 1, enclosing a copy of tlw motion fih-'<l in th<-> Di:;-
trict Court of vVebt>r Count>-, ddendant's Exhibit 2. 111 
said letter, respondt>nts in·eseute><l their claim as 
"Pursuant to statute .. , you an' entitled to 
notice of my claim, which claim is hert>with madt· 
against Weht>r County for thP sum of $1,000.00 
fair and reasonabh• compensation for sPrvic<'s l'l'll-
dered in ... the prt>paration of brief and argument 
of this case before the Snpn'me Court. 
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In the event I do not receive an acceptance 
or rejection of this claim prior to the date of hear-
ing ... I deem your failure to do so as a denial of 
::mid claim ... " 
Said letter and enclosed motion were duly received 
h.r tlw Board of County Commissioners, Weber County, 
\\ itl1 a carbon copy to the \Veber County Attorney. (A-
nH·mkd answer to interrogatory No. 1, R. 6; T. 11and12.) 
R(•spondents filed the complaint in this action on 
Xon"rnher 27, 1968, prior, rather than after, the denial of 
thPir appeal in case No. 11187. In paragraph 4 of said 
('Orn plaint, it is specifically pointed out that the complaint 
\ms filed prior to the possible expiration of the period 
of limitations contained in 17-15-12 UCA, as amended. 
(R.l) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF RES JUDICATA IS 
WITHOUT MERIT. 
While appellant quotes from Am.Jur. on this sub-
j<·d, the following additional statements from 30A Am . 
. Tur. J udg111ents clearly show that the instant case is not 
lmrn•d h.'' this doetrinP. 30.A Am. Jnr. section 347, p. 388, 
reads as follows: 
''Generally.-In stating the doctrine of res 
j udica ta, the courts usnally refer to the fact that 
the jndg11wnt sought to be used as a basis of the 
doctrine was rendered upon the merits, since it 
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is a general rule that a judginent i·e1tder('d on an1 
grounds which do not involve the 11wr· ts of tl1;, 
action may not be used as a lmsis for tl1l' 01wra-
tion of the doctrine of res judicata. Under this 
rule, an adjudication on grounds purely technical, 
where the merits eannot come into qn<'stion, i:' 
limited to the point actually decid(•d, and does nut 
preclude the maintenanee of a snbtsvquent action 
brought in a way to avoid the obj'-ction which 
proved fatal in the first action ... " 
And, in section 348, p. 390 : 
"What Is a Judg1nent on Merits, 
A judgment on the merits is said to be one vvhicli 
is based on legal rights as distinguished from 
mere matters of practice, procedure, jurisdiction, 
f " or orm, ... 
And, in section 349, p. 391: 
"Judgment Because of Misconception of 
Remedy.-The doctrine of res judicata is not 
available as a bar to a subsequent action if the 
judgment in the former action was rendered be-
cause of a misconception of the remedy availahle 
or of the proper form of proceeding. In such sit-
uation, the plaintiff is entitled to bring the proper 
proceeding to enforce, his cause of action. . . " 
And, in section 353, p. 394: 
"Judgment Based on Want of .Jurisdiction.-
A former adjudication is regarded as not being on 
the merits where it was based upon the fact that 
the court lacked jurisdiction. Consequently, the 
general rule is that a judgment for the defendant 
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hasPcl on ]a('k of ,jnrisdietion does not bar the 
plaintiff from bringing an action on the same 
cause in a court having jurisdiction ... " 
1-l<•rP, on (·xamination of court's decision in case 
Ko. 11187, court only decided that the provisions of 
CliaptN' G4, TitlP 77 are mandatory, not permissive, that 
a county res1rnM.:ible for fees 'IVhPre the appointment 
was made by this court, and that the proper procedure 
had not h<::>l'l1 followed in casP No. 11187; and it is only as 
to th\·se matters that tht• said decision is res judicata. 
371: 
F'nrthl'r, as statt>d in 30A Am.Jur., section 325, p. 
''General Application and Limitations.-The 
doctrine of res judicata is a principle of universal 
jurisprudence, forming a part of the legal systems 
of all civilized nations. rrhe doctrine is to be ap-
plied in particular situations as justice and sound 
application of the poiicy behind the doctrine re-
quire; it is not to be applied so rigidly as to de-
feat the ends of justice or so as to work an in-
justice ... " 
Certainly, 'IYlit>re, as in the instant case, there was no 
dl'ar-eut guidt> as to the 1n·ocednre to be followed until this 
\'UlLrt, in vVashington County vs. Day, clarified and set 
forth thP proper iirocednr·p, it would clearly be a mis-
<·arriagti of justice to use the doctrine of res judicata to 
1n·ecludP a hearing of rt>spondents' case on its merits. 
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POINT II. THERE HAS BEEN SUBSTAN'IIAL COMPLIANCJ:: 
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF 17-15-10 UCA 1953, AS AMEND 
ED, BY THE RESPONDENTS. 
Since, as mentioned pre\·ionsly, the proper procednn 
to be followed in collecting attorneys fees 1'.nder an ap-
pointment by this court was not clear, in 
order to preserve their rights if this court ( as it 
did in case No. 11187, that the proper proC'edure was to 
have filed a claim under 17-15-10 1953, as amendt•d, 
presented their claim to the Board of County Commis-
sioners, Weber County, by letter dated November lS, 
1967. Said letter enclosed a copy of the motion then pend-
ing before the Weber County District Court and request-
ed that the Weber County Board of Commissioners either 
accept or reject the claim and that an appearance by tlw 
county in opposition to the motion would be considered 
a denial of plaintiffs' claim. 
The proper rule, when construing a statute of 
nature, is found in 50 Am.J ur. Statutes, section 392, p. 
392: 
"Remedial Statutes.-It is a general rule of 
law that statutes which are remedial in nature are 
entitled to a liberal construction, in favor of the 
remedy provided by law, or in favor of thm;e en-
titled to the benefits of the statute. rrhis is true 
of a curative statute having a remedial purpose, 
or statutes seeking the correction of recognize<l 
errors and abuses, remedying defects in <:>arliN 
acts, or implying an intention to reform or extend 
existing rights." 
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\Vhen--, as ]wn•, the Board of County Commissioners 
and the Attorn<.'y rPceived resrJondents' letter 
dailll and ap1wan·d to resist the motion and on the ap-
peal, tlwy should not be vennitted to attempt to deny 
11oticP of such claim, on the grounds that re-
spondents should haYt> presc·nted the claim to the Weber 
County Auditor. This is particularly true in view of the 
language of 17-15-10, when•in it says: " ... nor shall 
tlw board credit or alloil' claim ... until it has been 
passed upon thP county auditor ... Every claim a-
gainst thl' county must be presented to the county auditor 
... " ( Pmphasis supplied), which could be interpreted 
to n•qnirt> the ]H'esentation of the claim to the auditor 
hy the Board of County Commissioners, rather than by 
tlw respondent, and only if they are allowing the 
dairn. Further, the last sentence of 17-15-10, which it 
lw noted "·as omitt2d from the quote of this statute 
the ap1wllant, reads as follows: "If the board shall re-
frnw to hPar or consider a claim because it is not properly 
madt' ont, it shall can::->e notice of the fact to be given to 
tltP claimant or to his agent. .. " This sentence is obvious-
ly intended to preclude the County is attempting 
to do hPre, i.P. to evade its responsibility for the payment 
of a valid claim on technical grounds, and casts upon the 
lJoard an affinnative duty to give a claimant notice of 
Jpfrets in his claim and tinw to correct the same. 
r_ehe proper rule was set out by this court in Burton 
l's. S((lt Lak,' Ci(1;, G9 Utah 18G, 253 P 443, 51 ALR 364, 
wht>rein thP court stated: 
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"The statnte n•(1nire:s tl1at in <-«' 'P a claim i.' 
deemed insufficient 01' in <'ertain var-
ticulars, the in:sufficien<'.V or d(•j\•ct lil.t:St lw lJOillt-
ed out by the cit_\·. rl1he <'it,\· not lia-:ing dmw 11u, 
it cannot now he ht>ard to :sa.'' that thv dairn 
insufficient." 
S al B( () 1 ( ''f •)') ,. j 1<)(" lj'Jj> k ee so Jwnwu cs. !.Jl en . ! y, .J.:> L .t 1 . J, • ·J 
561. At no time or in an_\· rnamwr l1a8 the Boanl (I 1· County 
Commissioners attempted to compl)· with thi:s affinnatiw 
duty in the instant ca:se, but im;tead, both at the }waring 
of the mobon in the District Court and on :suhs<•quent 
appeal to this court, has repeatedly <l<'nied an)· obligation 
to pay respondents. 
POINT III. THE CLAIM OF THE RESPONDENTS IS NOT 
BARRED BY STATUTE AS NOT BEING TIMELY FILED. 
As discussed previously, respondt>nt:s' ldter dairn 
was filed with the Board of County Couuni:ssionen; on 
November 18, 1967, for :se1TiC('S pnfonned in ca:-;e Ko. 
10905, which, contrary to the statement in 
brief, page 11, is the prnper case nnmher for the amH'al 
in State vs. Dixon. It is now, apparently, appellant's con-
tentjon that the claim \\'a:s pn•rnatnn·, on the ground that 
the last services had not been performed at tlw time the 
claim was filed. HO\n-ver, a::; testified to by n·sp1111dent 
at T. 4 and 5, the eriminal wo1·k pnforrned hy n·:-;1){)n-
dents is performed on a flat-fe<• ba:-;i:s. Com;eq11entl;.. 
under this concept, respond(•11h1' c-laim matured a1 tl1 1 
time of acceptance of the appointH1vnt and, nrnl(·1· 
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eoncept, com pldely ade(1 nate to comply with the re-
<inireHwnts of 17-15-10UCA1953, as amended. 
Further, in view of the County's participation in the 
hearing hefon· the \Veber County District Court and, 
suhse<1uently, before this Court, it is impossible to be-
lieve, as a practical matter, that the County was not com-
pl<'tel.v informed of the nature and t)1)e of respondents' 
claim and of their continuing assertion thereof. Respon-
dents had informed vVebm· County that they would con-
sider their appearance at the hearing on December 4, 
19G7, as a rejection; and at no time did the Weber County 
Board of Commissioners, through their attorney, indi-
C'ate any attitude except rejection of the claim in toto. 
17-15-12 UCA 1953, as amended, reads as follows: 
"Action on rejected claim-Limitation.-A 
claimant dissatisfied with the rejection of his 
claim or demand . . . may sue the county there-
for at any time within one year after the first 
rejection thereof by the board, but not after-
ward ... " 
Respondents filed tlwir complaint in the instant ac-
tion on N ovPmber 27, 19GS, prior to the expiration of 
one yPar from Dectm1ber 4, 1967. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing and the well-established rule 
of law in this jurisdiction that, upon appeal, the evidence 
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must be viewed in a hght most fayorable to 
the judgment of the trial court, and. as ht•re, then 
is substantial evidence to suport hi:s ckcisiun, the judg-
ment should be affirmed and respon<lunts g-rantPd their 
costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. E. RICHARDSON 
Attorn('y for Plaintiff and 
Respondents. 
